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PROSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTStt
Catharine A. (MracKinnon *
The gap between the promise of civil rights and the real lives of prosti-
tutes is an abyss which swallows up prostituted women.' To speak of
prostitution and civil rights in one breath moves the two into one
world, at once exposing and narrowing the distance between them.
Women in prostitution are denied every imaginable civil right in
every imaginable and unimaginable way,2 such that it makes sense to
understand prostitution as consisting in the denial of women's
humanity, no matter how humanity is defined. It is denied both
through the social definition and condition of prostitutes and through
the meaning of some civil rights.
The legal right to be free from torture and cruel and inhuman or
degrading treatment is recognized by most nations and is internationally
guaranteed. In prostitution, women are tortured through repeated rape
and in all the more conventionally recognized ways. Women are
prostituted precisely in order to be degraded and subjected to cruel and
brutal treatment without human limits; it is the opportunity to do this
that is exchanged when women are bought and sold for sex. The fact
that most legal prohibitions on torture apply only to official torture,
t © Catharine A. MacKinnon 1993.
1 This speech was given at the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law Symposium
entitled Prostitution: From Academia to Activism, held on October 31, 1992, at the
University of Michigan Law School. Comments by Dorchen Leidholdt and
Margaret Baldwin were especially helpful in its revision. The assistance of the ever-
resourceful University of Michigan Law Library and Rita Rendell are gratefully
acknowledged.
* Catharine A. MacKinnon is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School. She pioneered the legal claim for sexual'harassment as sex discrimination
and, with Andrea Dworkin, conceived and fielded ordinances recognizing pornogra-
phy as a violation of women's civil rights. She is currently representing women and
children survivors of genocidal rape and prostitution in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
I. This discussion focuses on prostituted women and girls as the paradigm case,
remembering that boys and sometimes men are also prostituted.
2. This discussion builds upon prior presentations at the conference in which the
conditions of women in prostitution were documented. See generally Evelina
Giobbe, Juvenile Prostitution: Profile of Recruitment, in CHILD TRAuMA I: ISSUES AND
RESEARCH 117 (Ann W. Burgess ed., 1992); Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying
the Right to Rape, RAPE AND SExuAL AssAuLT III: A REsEARCH HANDBOOK 143
(Ann W. Burgess ed., 1991); and citations throughout this article.
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specifically torture by state actors, illustrates the degree to which the
legal design of civil rights has excluded women's experience of being
denied them.
Security of the person is fundamental to society. The point of
prostitution is to transgress women's personal security. Every time the
woman walks up to the man's car, every time the man walks into the
brothel, the personhood of women-not that secure in a male domi-
nated society to begin with-is made more insecure. Women in prosti-
tution attempt to set limits on what can be done to them. But nothing
backs them up. Pimps supposedly do, but it shows how insecure prosti-
tutes' lives are that pimps can look like security. Nothing limits pimps,
and, ultimately, anything can be done to their property for a price. As
Andrea Dworkin has said, "whatever can be stolen can be sold." 3 In
rape, the security of women's person is stolen; in prostitution, it is
stolen and sold.
Liberty is a primary civil right. Kathleen Barry has analyzed female
sexual slavery as prostitution one cannot get out Of.4 A recent study of
street prostitutes in Toronto found that about ninety percent wanted to
leave but could not.5 If they are there because they cannot leave, they
are sexual slaves. Need it be said: to be a slave is to be deprived of
liberty, not to exercise it. To lack the ability to set limits on one's
condition or to leave it is to lack consent to it. At the same time,
liberty for men is often construed in sexual terms and includes liberal
access to women, including prostituted ones. So while, for men, liberty
entails that women be prostituted, for women, prostitution entails loss
of all that liberty means.
The right to privacy is often included among civil rights. In the
United States, one meaning privacy has effectively come to have is the
right to dominate free of public scrutiny. The private is then defined as
a place of freedom by effectively rendering consensual what women and
children are forced to do out of the public eye. Prostitution is thus
often referred to as occurring in private between consenting adults, as is
3. See ANDREA DWORKIN, LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE: WRITINGS 1976-1989 229
(1989).
4. See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979).
5. ELIZABETH FRY SocIETY OF TORONTO, STREETWORK OUTREACH wiTH ADULT
FEMALE STREET PROSTITUTES 13 (May 1987) ("Approximately 90% of the women
contacted indicated they wished to stop working on the streets at some point, but
felt unable or unclear about how to even begin this process.").
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marriage and family.6 The result is to extend the aura of privacy and
protection from public intervention from sex to sexual abuse. In
prostitution, women have no space they can call off-limits to prying
eyes, prying hands, or prying other parts of the anatomy, not even
inside their own skin.
Freedom from arbitrary arrest is also a civil right. Criminal prosti-
tution laws make women into criminals for being victimized as women,
so are arguably arbitrary in the first place. 7 Then these laws are often
enforced for bureaucratic, turf-protective, funding, political, or
advancement reasons 8 -that is, arbitrarily, against women.
Property ownership is recognized as a civil right in many countries.
Women in prostitution not only begin poor, they are systematically
kept poor by pimps who take the lion's share of what they earn. They
are the property of the men who buy and sell and rent them-placing
the civil right, once again, in the hands of their tormenters.
Particularly in the United States, the right to freedom of speech is
cherished. Prostitution as an institution silences women by brutalizing
and terrorizing them so horribly that no words can form, by punishing
them for telling the truth about their condition, by degrading whatever
they do manage to say about virtually anything because of who they are
seen as being. The pornography that is made of their violation-pimps'
speech-is protected expression. 9
One civil right is so deep it is seldom mentioned: to be recognized
as a person before the law. To be a prostitute is to be a legal nonperson
in the ways that matter. What for Blackstone and others was the legal
nonpersonhood of wives10 is extended for prostitutes from one man to
all men as a class. Anyone can do anything to you and nothing legal
will be done about it. John Stoltenberg has shown how the social
definition of personhood for men is importantly premised on the
6. Some think there is a separate civil right to family. Women face losing their
children if it is found they are prostitutes. I have never heard of a man losing his
children because he was found to be a trick or a pimp.
7. One of the best things about this conference was the relative absence of lawyers and
with them the narrow terms and endless posturing of the decriminalization debate,
in which harm is recognized to result only from criminal laws against prostitution,
almost never from prostitution itself.
8. See generally People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 562 P.2d 1315 (Cal.
1977).
9. See generally American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442
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prostitution of women.11 Prostitution as a social institution gives men
personhood-in this case, manhood-through depriving women of
theirs.
The civil right to life is basic. The Green River murders, the serial
murders of women in Los Angeles, the eleven dead African-American
women who had been in prostitution and were found under piles of
rags in Detroit-these acts are "gender cleansing." Snuff films are part
of it. When killing women becomes a sex act, women have no right to
their lives. Women in prostitution, along with women cohabiting with
men, are the most exposed.
Equality is also a civil right, both equal humanity in substance and
formal equality before the law. In the United States, constitutional
equality encompasses equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment and freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude under
the Thirteenth Amendment. Prostitution implicates both.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides for equal protection and
benefit of the law without discrimination. What little equality litigation
exists in the prostitution context misses the point of their unequal
treatment in a number of illuminating ways. Some older prostitution
statutes, challenged as sex discriminatory on their face, made prostitu-
tion illegal only when a woman engaged in it. For example, Louisiana
provided that "[p]rostitution is the practice by a female of indiscrimi-
nate sexual intercourse with males for compensation." 12 Applying the
sex discrimination test at the time, the court ruled that "[d]ifferences
between the sexes does bear a rational relationship to the prohibition of
prostitution by females."13 In other words, defining prostitution as
something only women do is simple realism. Women really do this;
mostly only women do this; it seems to have something to do with
S1i. See generally John Stoltenberg, Male Sexuality: Why Ownership Is Sexy, 1 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 59 (1993).
12. State v. DeVall, 302 So. 2d 909, 910 (La. 1974) (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:82 (West 1986)).
13. DeVall, 302 So. 2d at 913. See also City of Minneapolis v. Burchette, 240 N.W.2d
500, 505 (Minn. 1976) (arresting chiefly female violators of prostitution law is a
rational way to meet the objective of controlling prostitution). This position has not
changed significantly with elevated scrutiny. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 649 P. 2d
485, 487 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that there is no arbitrary enforcement of
prostitution statute under state equal rights amendment); Bolser v. Washington
State Liquor Control Bd., 580 P.2d 629, 633 (Wash. 1978) (holding that male and
female dancers are equally covered by restrictions on topless dancing, resulting in no
violation of state equal rights amendment).
(Vol. 1:13
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being a woman to do this; therefore, it is not sex discrimination to have
a law that punishes only women for doing this.
Here, the fact that most prostitutes are women is not a sex
inequality, nor does equating prostitution with being a woman tell us
anything about what being a woman means. That most prostitutes are
women is the reason why legally defining the problem of prostitution as
a problem of women is not a sex inequality. Thus does the soft focus of
gender neutrality blur sex distinctions by law and rigidly sex-divided
social realities at the same time. By now, most legislatures have gender-
neutralized their prostitution laws" 4-without having done anything to
gender-neutralize prostitution's realities.
The cases that adjudicate equal protection challenges to sex-dis-
criminatory enforcement of prostitution laws extend this rationale.
Police usually send men to impersonate tricks in order to arrest
prostitutes. Not surprisingly, many more women than men are arrested
in this way.15 The cases hold that this is not intentional sex
discrimination but a good faith effort by the state to get at "the sellers
of sex,"16 "the profiteer."' 7 Sometimes the tricks are even described by
police as the women's "victim." 18 Courts seem to think the women
make the money; in most instances, they are conduits from trick to
pimp and the money is never theirs. 19 Sometimes the male police
14. But cf Fluker v. State, 282 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ga. 1981) (applying Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)) (upholding a sex-specific
pandering statute based on U.S. Supreme Court recognition of biological differences
between the sexes when upholding a statutory rape law). Another strategy for
preserving sex-specific prostitution statutes, a two-wrongs-make-a-right rationale, was
exhibited in Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F.2d 922, 928 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (a
prostitution statute allegedly selectively enforced against women was found not to
ground an equal protection claim because the second section of the challenged ordi-
nance against pimping applied only to males). Compare Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966,
968 (Alaska 1979) (striking a sex-specific prohibition but finding it severable).
15. I am told by women police officers that they loathe being decoys, although some of
their work has resulted in spectacular arrests of pillars of the community. No
woman should be forced to present herself as available for sexual use, whether as a
prostitute or as a police officer ordered to pose as a prostitute as part of her employ-
ment.
16. United States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 55 (D.C. 1975). Another reason offered for
not using women police decoys is that, due to past sex discrimination, there are few
or no women to use. See People v. Burton, 432 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (City Ct. of
Buffalo 1980).
17. People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 562 P2d 1315, 1321 (Cal. 1977).
18. People v. Nelson, 427 N.YS.2d 194, 195 (City Ct. of Syracuse 1980).
19. Janice Toner, a former prostitute, argued that the money she made as a prostitute
1993]
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decoys wait to arrest until the sex act is about to happen-or,
prostitutes complain, until after it happens.20
Another all-too-common practice is arresting accused prostitutes,
women, while letting arrested customers, men, go with a citation or a
warning.21 This, too, has been challenged as sex discrimination, and it
sure sounds like it. Yet this, courts say, is not sex discrimination be-
cause male and female prostitutes are treated alike22 or because
customers violate a different, noncomparable, law from the one under
which the women are charged.23 There are some men in prostitution,
was not income to her because she was merely a conduit to her husband/pimp, who
beat and threatened to kill her and their children. The Tax Court rejected the
argument, although her husband was convicted of assault in a separate case. Toner
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1016, 1019 (1990). The Court found that
Toner did not show that her husband's abuse was causally connected to her earning
of an income from prostitution and characterized her as an active, voluntary partici-
pant in some aspects of the prostitution business. Id. at 1021.
20. State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 984 (Haw. 1985) (finding no denial of due process
when civilian police agent had sex with woman for money before arresting her for
prostitution).
21. See Superior Court of Alameda County, 562 P2d at 1320-23. When both prostitute
and customer are male, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is more typical to arrest
both. Some cases alleging sex-differential enforcement fail for lack of showing of
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 585 (Ill. 1992);
United States v. Wilson, 342 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975). Others fail for
lack of proof that men in comparable circumstances are treated differently. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cozart, 321 A.2d 342, 344 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that
male homosexual prosecuted for solicitation to sodomy failed to prove equal
protection violation based on unequal enforcement because "[tihere is no indication
in the record ... as to whether lesbian solicitation was known to the police.");
State v. Gaither, 224 S.E.2d 378, 380 (Ga. 1976) (finding no evidence that male
prostitutes exist in detectable numbers); Young v. State, 446 N.E.2d 624, 626 n.4
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 205 (Sup. Jud.
Ct. Mass. 1977) (finding no evidence that male prostitutes are not prosecuted); City
of Minneapolis v. Buschette, 240 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn. 1976).
22. See Superior Court ofAlameda County, 562 P2d at 1323. See also Morgan v. City of
Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922, 928 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
23. One court rejected this decisively in the 1920s:
Men caught with women in an act of prostitution are equally guilty, and
should be arrested and held for trial with the women. The law is dear,
and the duty of the police is to act in pursuance of the law. The practical
application of the law as heretofore enforced is an unjust discrimination
against women in the matter of an offense which, in its very nature, if
completed, requires the participation of men .... As long as the law is
upon the statute books, it must be impartially administered without sex
discrimination.
People v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631, 635 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1920). In 1980, the City
(VCol. 1:13
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most (but not all) prostituting as women. You can tell you have walked
into the world of gender neutrality when the law treats men as badly as
women when they do what mostly women do, and that makes treating
women badly non-sex-based. Of course, compared with customers,
prostitutes also more often fail to satisfy the gender-neutral conditions
of release: good money, good name, good job, good family, good
record, good lawyer, good three-piece suit ....
Some states quarantine arrested women prostitutes but not arrested
male customers. This, too, is not sex discrimination, according to the
courts, because the women are more likely to communicate venereal
diseases than the men are.24 Where the women got the venereal diseases
is not discussed; women are walking disease vectors from which men's
health must be protected. This was before AIDS, but the reality
remains-the recipient of the sperm is most likely to become infected.25
Court of Syracuse, endorsing this reasoning, further rejected the dodge arguing that
prostitute and patron are "not similarly situated" for equal protection purposes
because they violate separate sections of the penal code. That court found that "the
only significant difference in the proscribed behavior is that the prostitute sells sex
and the patron buys it. Neither gender nor solicitation is a differentiating factor."
People v. Nelson, 427 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (City Ct. of Syracuse 1980) (finding no
evidence of intent to discriminate, therefore no discrimination shown). One court
upheld a gender-neutral prostitution law from equal protection attack by pointing
out that "[w]hat would be prostitution for a female would be equally prohibited
and punished as lewdness for a male." State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa
1976), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 916 (1976). It was apparently inconceivable that
a male could be a prostitute. Most courts that have considered sex-differential
enforcement challenges on equal protection grounds have relied, for rejecting them,
on the distinction in statutes under which prostitutes and patrons fall. See, e.g.,
Matter of Dora P., 418 N.Y.S.2d 597, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (prostitution
and patronizing a prostitute are discrete crimes making differential treatment of
women and men under them not discriminatory); Commonwealth v. King, 372
N.E.2d 196 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1977) (finding that the lack of a statute against
patronage does not violate equal protection rights of prostitutes). See also Garrett v.
United States, 339 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cr. App. 1975) (holding that a state's failure to
require corroboration in prostitution cases, although requiring it in homosexuality
cases, is not unconstitutional sex discrimination because it is not based on gender).
A ray of reality is provided by one recent ruling holding that women's equality
rights were violated when female performers, and not male patrons, were selectively
prosecuted for sexual activity at a private club. However, it was important to the
ruling that the sexes were "similarly situated" because the women and the men
could have been charged under the same statutory provision. See generally State v.
McCollum, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
24. See Superior Court of Alameda County, 562 P2d at 1323.
25. See Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 E2d 1378, 1383 (10th Cir. 1973) (finding no
equal protection violation in arresting only the prostitute when she is regarded as
"the potential source" of venereal disease and the customer is not).
1993]
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These cases represent the extent to which equal protection of the
laws has been litigated for prostitutes. 26 The disparity between the focus
of this litigation and the civil rights violations inherent in prostitution
is staggering. Behind the blatant sex discrimination these cases
rationalize is the vision of equality they offer prostitutes-the right to
be prostituted without being disproportionately punished for it. As
unprincipled as the losses in these cases are, if they had been won, this
is the equality they would have won.
Criminal laws against prostitution make women into criminals for
being victimized as women, yet there are no cases challenging these laws
as sex discrimination on this ground. Criminal prostitution laws collab-
orate elaborately in women's social inequality;27 through them, the state
enforces the exploitation of prostituted women directly. When legal
victimization is piled on top of social victimization, women are dug
deeper and deeper into civil inferiority, their subordination and isola-
tion legally ratified and legitimated. Disparate enforcement combines
with this discriminatory design to violate prostituted women's Four-
teenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.
This is not to argue that prostitutes have a sex equality right to
engage in prostitution. Rather, prostitution subordinates and exploits
and disadvantages women as women in social life, a social inequality
which prostitution laws then seal with a criminal sanction.
The argument to decriminalize trafficking women has no such
support. Disadvantage on the basis of sex directly supports strict
enforcement of laws against pimps, who exploit women's inequality for
gain, 28 and against tricks, who benefit from women's oppressed status
26. One significant departure from this line of cases, from the standpoint of equality
analysis, is represented by the Seventh Circuit's invalidation of a strip-search policy
for prostituted women only, which ignored "similarly situated males." This policy
was found not to be validly based on gender and therefore in violation of the equal
protection guarantee under current standards of scrutiny. Mary Beth G. v. City of
Chicago, 723 l.2d 1263, 1273-74 (7th Cit. 1983). See also White v. Fleming, 522
F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding that a statute prohibiting female, but not male,
bar-employees from sitting or standing at or behind the bar violates equal protec-
tion).
27. As Margaret Baldwin has stressed to me, part of the complexity of this situation is
that jail sometimes provides comparative safety for the women, and the criminal
status of prostitution provides some barrier to recruitment and validation for the
women's sense of violation. These concerns could be met without making women
criminals.
28. For a vivid description of the inequality between pimp and prostitute, see Dorchen
Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Violation of Women's Human Rights, 1 CARDOZO
[Vol. 1: 13
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and subordinate individual women skin on skin.
Beyond eliminating discriminatory criminal laws and enforcing
appropriate ones, it is time the law did something for women in prosti-
tution. Getting the criminal law off their backs may keep the state from
reinforcing their subordinate status but it does nothing to change that
status. The Thirteenth Amendment, which applies whether or not the
state is involved, may help.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude. It, and its implementing statutes, was passed to invalidate the
chattel slavery of African-Americans and kindred social institutions. 29 Its
language that slavery "shall [not] exist" gives support to its affirmative
elimination. The Thirteenth Amendment has been applied to invalidate
a range of arrangements of forced labor and exploitive servitude.30 The
slavery of African-Americans is not the first or last example of enslave-
ment, although it has rightly been one of the most notorious. To apply
the Thirteenth Amendment to prostitution is not to equate prostitution
with the chattel slavery of African-Americans but to draw on common
features of institutions of forcible inequality in the context of the
Thirteenth Amendment's implementation.
Compared with slavery of African-Americans, prostitution is older,
more pervasive across cultures, does not include as much non-sexual
WOMAmN's L.J. 133 (1993).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). See also
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (Justice Brown said that "involun-
tary servitude" was added to "slavery" to cover the peonage of Mexicans and the
trade in Chinese labor); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) ("LT]he term
involuntary servitude was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to
African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable
results."). See generally Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B.J. 7 (1951) (an illuminating history of the
early years of the Thirteenth Amendment).
30. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ("[T]he words involuntary
servitude have a 'larger meaning than slavery.' ") (quoting The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)). Also the Ninth Circuit has stated:
[Y]esterday's slave may be today's migrant worker or domestic servant.
Today's involuntary servitor is not always black; he or she may just as
well be Asian, Hispanic, or a member of some other minority group.
Also, the methods of subjugating people's wills have changed from.blatant
slavery to more subtle, if equally effective, forms of coercion.
United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation and
footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
1993]
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exploitation, and is based on sex, and sex and race combined. For Black
women in the United States, the relation between prostitution and
slavery is less one of analogy than of continuity with their sexual use
under slavery.31 Applying the Thirteenth Amendment to prostitution
claims enslavement as a term and reality of wider application, which
historically it has been. It also takes the view that the Thirteenth
Amendment was intended to prohibit the forms slavery took for Black
women just as much as those it took for Black men.
Thirteenth Amendment 32 standards require a showing of legal or
physical force, used or threatened, to secure service, which must be
"distinctly personal service ... in which one person possesses virtually
unlimited authority over another."33 Some cases predicated servitude on
psychological coercion, 34 but the Supreme Court recently held that a
climate of fear alone is not enough.3 5 The vulnerabilities of the victims
are still relevant to determining whether physical or legal coercion or
threats compel the service, rendering it "slavelike." 36 Recognized vulner-
abilities have included mental retardation, being an illegal immigrant,
not speaking the language, being a child, and being stranded in a
foreign city without means of support.3 7 Poverty has been pervasively
31. See Vednita Nelson, Prostitution: Where Racism & Sexism Intersect, I MicH. J.
GEND.R & L. 81, 84, 85 (1993).
32. Prosecutions under the Thirteenth Amendment are typically brought under 18
U.S.C. § 1584 (1988), which makes it a crime knowingly and willfully to hold or
sell another person "to involuntary servitude," and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), which
prohibits conspiracy to interfere with an individual's Thirteenth Amendment right
to be free from "involuntary servitude."
33. Hamilton, supra note 29, at 7.
34. See, e.g., United States -: Ancarola, I E 676, 683 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) (consider-
ing the case of an eleven-year-old Italian boy held in involuntary servitude by a
padrone due to his youth and dependence which left him incapable of choosing
alternatives).
35. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50 (1988). For an analysis of
combined psychological and economic coercion, see United States v. Shackney, 333
F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
37. See Kozminski 487 U.S. at 952 (mental retardation); United States v. King, 840
F.2d 1276 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988) (children); United States v.
Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (non-
English speaking, passports withheld, paid little money for services); Bernal v,
United States, 241 F. 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918)
(alienage, no means of support, "did not know her way about town"); Ancarola, 1
F. at 676 (child).
[Vol. 1:13
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understood as part of the setting of force.38
The Thirteenth Amendment has often been found violated when a
person is tricked into peonage or service through fraud or deceit and is
then kept unable to leave, including through contrived and manipulated
indebtedness.39 Debt is not a requirement of servitude, but it is a
common incident of it. One recent case found that victims-called
victims in these cases-were forced into domestic service by enticing
them to travel to the United States, where they were paid little for
exorbitant work hours and had their passports and return tickets with-
held, while they were required to work off, as servants, the cost of their
transportation.40 Corroborating evidence has included extremely poor
working conditions.
4 1
Indentured servitude has long been legally prohibited in the United
States, even prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. 42 In
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment in contemporary peonage
contexts, courts have been far less concerned with whether the
condition was voluntarily entered and far more with whether the
subsequent service was involuntary. 43 That victims believe they have no
38. No cases of involuntary servitude involve wealthy or solvent victims. For examples
where the poverty of the victims is emphasized as both a precondition of the
servitude and a product of it, see Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 935 ("Molitoris was living
on the streets of Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the early 1970s when Ike Kozminski
brought him to work .... ."); United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 832 (1 Ith
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986) ("Gaston could not leave because he
had no money .... These accounts ... revealed an operation where individuals
were picked up under false pretenses, delivered to a labor camp to work long hours
for little or no pay, and kept in the fields by poverty, alcohol, threats, and acts of
violence.") (citations omitted); Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1450 (poor Indonesians paid
little for services); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1981)
(finding that migrant labor camp, into which laborers were abducted, fits vision of
forced labor under statutes which protected "persons without property and without
skills save those in tending the fields. With little education, little money and little
hope .... ); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 873 (1945) (women who could not pay their own fines were released
when pimp paid their fines, then forced them to work at his road house); Bernal,
241 F. at 341 (low-paid woman fraudulently induced by promise of better pay to
go to brothel where "[s]he had no money").
39. See generally Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448.
40. Mussry, 726 E2d at 1450, 1453.
41. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952 (O'Connor, J., for the plurality); id., at 956 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
42. Case of Mary Clark, I Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821). See generally Hamilton, supra note
29.
43. See, e.g., Mussry, 726 E2d 1448. The later ruling by the Supreme Court in
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viable alternative but to serve in the ways in which they are being
forced has also supported a finding of coercion, and with it the
conclusion that the condition is one of enslavement. 4 Involuntary
servitude has embraced situations in which a person has made a difficult
but rational decision to remain in bondage.
4 5
If the legal standards for involuntary servitude developed outside
the sexual context are applied to the facts of prostitution, the situations
of most of the women in it are clearly prohibited. In prostitution,
human beings are bought and sold as chattel for use in "distinctly
personal service."' 46 Many women and girls are sold by one pimp to
another as well as from pimp to trick and for pornography. Prostitution
was not formerly called "white slavey" for nothing.
47
Prostitution occurs within multiple power relations of domination,
degradation, and subservience 48 of the pimp and trick over the
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, restricting Mussry doctrines does not cut back on this
aspect of the courts' customary approach to this issue.
44. United States v. King, 840 E2d 1276, 1281 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
894 (1988) (finding a conspiracy to deprive children living in a religious commune
of rights under Thirteenth Amendment, in part because of a belief by the children
that they "had no viable alternative but to perform service for the defendants.").
When physical force is also present, Kozminski poses no barrier to prosecution. Id.
at 1281.
45. United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1007 (1978).
46. Hamilton, supra note 29, at 7.
47. This term was apparently used originally to parallel and distinguish prostitution of
all women, induding women of color, from slavery of Africans as such. Traite des
Noires, trade in Blacks, referred to slavery of Blacks; in 1905, Traite des Blanches,
trade in whites, was used at an international conference to refer to sexual sale and
purchase of women and children. Marlene D. Beckman, The White Slave Traffic
Act: The Historical Impact of a Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 GEO. L.J. 1111
n.2 (1984) (citing V. BULLOUGH, PROsTITUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 245
(1978)); KATHLEEN BARRY, supra note 4, at 32 (1979). The British government
translated the latter term as "White Slave Traffic or Trade," then shortened to white
slavery. Beckman, supra at 1111 n.2 (quoting BULLOUGH, at 245). Whatever its
initial intent, the appellation "had immediate appeal to racists who could and did
conclude that the efforts were against an international traffic in white women,"
although women of all colors were exploited in prostitution. BARRY, supra note 4, at
32. Kathleen Barry further observes that the 1921 substitution of the term "Traffic
in Women and Children" for white slavery worked to separate international
trafficking in women from local prostitution, "thereby distracting attention from the
continuing enslavement of women in local prostitution." BARRY, supra note 4, at
32-33. Recognizing prostitution as unconstitutional slavery would help restore this
attention.
48. Here I draw on Akhil Amar's and Daniel Widawsky's proposed working definition
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prostitute: men over women, older over younger, citizen over alien,
moneyed over impoverished, violent over victimized, connected over
isolated, housed over homeless, tolerated and respected over despised.
All of the forms of coercion and vulnerabilities recognized under the
Thirteenth Amendment are common in prostitution, and then some.
No social institution exceeds it in physical violence. It is common for
prostitutes to be deprived of food and sleep and money, beaten,
tortured, raped, and threatened with their lives, both as acts for which
the pimp is paid by other men and to keep the women in line.
49
Women in prostitution are subject to near total domination. Much of
this is physical, but pimps also develop to a high art forms of
nonphysical force to subjugate the women's will. Their techniques of
mind control often exploit skills women have developed to survive
sexual abuse, such as denial, dissociation, and multiplicity. They also
manipulate women's desire for respect and self-respect.
Criminal laws against prostitution provide legal force behind its
social involuntariness. Women in prostitution have no police protection
because they are criminals, making pimps' protection racket both possi-
ble and necessary. In addition to being able to inflict physical abuse
with impunity, pimps confiscate the women's earnings and isolate them
even beyond the stigma they carry. The women then have nowhere but
pimps to turn to bail them out after arrest, leaving them in debt for
their fines which must be worked out in trade. Thus the law collabo-
rates in enforcing women's involuntary servitude by turning the victim
of peonage into a criminal. 50 Such legal complicity is state action,
raising a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for sex discrimination
by state law.51
While it is dangerous to imply that some prostitution is forced,
leaving the rest of it to seem free, as a matter of fact, most if not all
prostitution is ringed with force in the most conventional sense, from
of slavery. Akhil Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 1359, 1365 (1992).
49. See generally Leidholdt, supra note 28; BARRY, supra note 4, at 3-5; Activities for the
Advancement of Women: Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. ESCOR, Ist Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 12, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. E/1983/7 (1983).
50. For analogous situations, see Jaremillo v. Romero, I N.M. 190, 197-99 (1857)
(involuntary servitude formally sanctioned by law). See also Taylor v. Georgia, 315
U.S. 25, 29-31 (1942) (striking down state laws which did not sanction involuntary
servitude directly, but played a key role in it).
51. This raises a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) and potential criminal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1992).
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incest to kidnapping to forced drugging to assault to criminal law. Sex-
based poverty, both prior to and during prostitution, enforces it; while
poverty alone has not been recognized as making out a case of coercion,
it has been recognized as making exit impossible in many cases in
which coercion has been found. If all of the instances in which these
factors interacted to keep a woman in prostitution were addressed, there
would be little of it left.
Beyond this, the Thirteenth Amendment may prohibit prostitution
as an institution. In the words of The Three Prostitutes' Collectives
from Nice, "all prostitution is forced prostitution . .. we would not
lead the 'life' if we were in a position to leave it."52 In this perspective,
prostitution as such is coerced, hence could be prohibited as servitude.
At the very least, there is authority for taking the victims' inequality
into account when courts assess whether deprivation of freedom of
choice is proven. 53
On a few occasions in the past, the Thirteenth Amendment has
been used to prosecute pimps for prostituting women. 54 In these federal
criminal cases, the prostitution was forced in order to pay a debt the
women supposedly owed the pimp. In one case, the defendant procured
two women from a prison by paying their fines and then forced them
to repay him by prostituting at his road house.55 In another, young
Mexican women were induced to accept free transportation to jobs
which did not exist and then were told they could not return home
until they repaid the cost of the transportation through prostitution.56
These women were financially trapped, sometimes physically assaulted,
always threatened, and in fear. Some complied with the prostitution;
some were able to resist. In these cases, the prostitution as such was not
52. Activities for the Advancement of Women: Equality Development and Peace, supra note
49, at 8 (quoting testimony by three "collectives" of women prostitutes given to the
Congress of Nice on September 8, 1981).
53. The Peonage Cases, 123 E 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1903) (stating that the trier of fact
"must consider the situation of the parties, the relative inferiority or inequality
between the person contracting to perform the service and the person exercising the
force or influence to compel its performance . . ").
54. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 146 E2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 873 (1945); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied,
245 U.S. 672 (1918). See aho United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207, 214 (10th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976) (upholding conviction for involuntary
servitude in prostitution context).
55. Pierce, 146 F.2d at 84.
56. Bernal, 241 F. at 341.
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considered involuntary servitude-the coercion into doing it was. But it
is implicit in these cases that prostitution is not something a woman,
absent force, would choose to do.
It is worth asking whether coercion of women into sex in a
Thirteenth Amendment context would be measured by the legal
standards by which courts have measured the coerciveness of nonsexual
exploitation of groups that include men. The coercion of women into
and within prostitution has been invisible because prostitution is
considered sex and sex is considered what women are for. The standards
for the meaning of women's "yes" in the sexual context range from
approximating a dead body's enthusiasm, to fighting back and
screaming "no," to pleading with an armed rapist to use a condom.57
This being free choice, one wonders what coercion would look like. Sex
in general, particularly sex for survival, is so pervasively merged with the
meaning of being a woman that whenever sex occurs, under whatever
conditions, the woman tends to be defined as freely acting.
Suits for prostitution as involuntary servitude confront the notion
that women-some women who are "just like that" or women in
general-are in prostitution freely. No condition of freedom is prepared
for by sexual abuse in childhood, permits and condones repeated rapes
and beatings, and subjects its participants to a risk of premature death
of forty times the national average.5s The fact that most women in
57. A grand jury in Austin, Texas failed to indict a man for rape where the victim
asked him to wear a condom. Apparently, the woman's request somehow implied
her consent. Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1992, § 1 at 30. A second grand jury did indict the man for
rape and he was later convicted in a jury trial. Rapist Who Agreed to Use Condom
Gets 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1993, § 1 at 6.
58. For data on rape in prostitution, see Leidholdt, supra note 28, at 138; Mimi H.
Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8 CrM. JUST.
BEHAv. 395, 397 (1981) (70% of San Francisco street prostitutes reported rape by
dients an average of 31 times); COUNCIL FOR PRosrIrrIoN ALTERNATIvEs, 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (48% of prostitutes were raped by pimps an average of 16 times
a year, 79% by johns an average of 33 times a year). For data on beatings, see
Silbert & Pines, supra at 397 (65% of prostitutes beaten by customers); COUNCIL
FOR PRos mTroN ALTERNATrvES, supra at 4 (63% were beaten by pimps an
average of 58 times a year). For data on mortality, see PORNOGRAPHY AND PROs'n-
TUTION IN CANADA: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PORNOGRAPHY AND
PROSTITUTON, VOLUME II 350 (1985) (finding that in Canada the mortality rate
for prostituted women is 40 times the national average); Leidholdt, supra note 28,
at 138 n.15 (the Justice Department estimates that a third of the over 4,000
women killed by serial murderers in 1982 were prostitutes).
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prostitution were sexually abused as children,5 9 and most entered prosti-
tution itself before they were adults,60 undermines the patina of free-
dom and the glamour of liberation that is the marketing strategy appar-
ently needed for most customers to enjoy using them. Such suits would
also challenge freedom of choice as a meaningful concept for women
under conditions of sex inequality. Women's precluded options in
societies that discriminate on the basis of sex, including in employment,
are fundamental to the prostitution context. If prostitution is a free
choice, why are the women with the fewest choices the ones most often
found doing it?6
1
When a battered woman sustains the abuse of one man for eco-
nomic survival for twenty years, not even this legal system believes she
consents to the abuse anymore. Asking why she did not leave has begun
to be replaced by noticing what keeps her there.6 2 Perhaps when wom-
en in prostitution sustain the abuse of thousands of men for economic
survival for twenty years, this will, at some point, come to be under-
stood as non-consensual as well. And many do not survive. They are
merely kept alive until they can no longer be used. Then they are sold
one last time to someone who kills them for sex, or they are OD'd in
an alley or otherwise end up under those trash heaps in Detroit.
59. See Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Entrance into Prostitution, 13 YOUTH &
SoclETY 471, 479 (1982) (60% of prostitutes were sexually abused in childhood);
Leidholdt, supra note 28, at 136 n.4 (quoting MIMI SILBERT, SEXuAL ASSAULT or
PROSTITUTES: PHASE ONE 40 (1980)) (66% of subjects are sexually assaulted by
father or father figure); THE COUNCIL FOR PROSTITUTION ALTERNATIVES, 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (85% of clients have histories of sexual abuse in childhood, 70%
most frequently by their fathers).
60. See CECILIE HOIGARD & Lwv FINSTAD, BACKSTREETS: PROSTITUTION, MONEY, AND
LOVE 76 (Katherine Hanson et al. trans., 1992) (average age of prostitutes inter-
viewed in Norway began at 15 1/2 years). Compare Leidholdt, supra note 28, at 136
n.3 (citing Evelina Giobbe, founder of Minneapolis-based advocacy project, Women
Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt (WHISPER)) (fourteen is the
average age of women's entry into prostitution); Roberta Perkins, Working Girls:
Prostitutes, This Life and Social Control 258 (1991) (finding in her Australian sample
that almost half entered prostitution before age 20, and over 80% before age 25);
Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8
CRIM. JuST. BEHAV. 395, 396 (1981) (68% were 16 years or younger when entered
prostitution).
61. For a superb discussion of the "choice" illusion, see Leidholdt, supra note 28, at
136-138.
62. For an argument that domestic battery of women is involuntary servitude, see Joyce
E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Woman, Involuntary Servitude, and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992).
[Vol. 1:13
PROSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The fact that the coercion in prostitution will be difficult to estab-
lish in law when it is so overwhelmingly obvious in life is both why it
would be difficult to win these cases and why it is crucial to try. It is
also helpful to be trying in a legal context such as the Thirteenth
Amendment that has traditionally emphasized less how one was
subjected in the first place and more the barriers to leaving the
subjected state.
The best thing about criminal law is that the state does it, so
women do not have to. The worst thing about criminal law is that the
state does not do it, so women still have to. Fortunately for women, the
Thirteenth Amendment has a civil application, meaning we can use it
ourselves. Under § 1985(3), prostituted women could allege that they
have been subjected to a conspiracy to deprive them of civil rights as
women. The conspiracy is the easy part-pimps never do this alone. In
a supply-side conspiracy, they prostitute women through organized
crime, gangs, associations, cults, families, hotel owners, and police.
There is also a demand-side conspiracy, more difficult to argue but
certainly there, between pimps and tricks.
Long unresolved is whether § 1985(3) applies to conspiracies on the
basis of sex. In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that the group
"women who seek and receive abortions" was not an adequate class for
purposes of § 1985(3) because it was not based on sex.63 The court did
not say that sex-based conspiracies are not actionable under § 1985(3);
several members of the court said that they are. Prostituted women are
an even more persuasive sex-based class. How hard can it be to prove
that women are prostituted as women? Not only is prostitution over-
whelmingly done to women by men, every aspect of the condition has
defined gender female as such and as inferior for centuries. Evelina
Giobbe explains how the status and treatment of prostitutes defines all
women as a sex: "[T]he prostitute symbolizes the value of women in
society. She is paradigmatic of women's social, sexual, and economic
subordination in that her status is the basic unit by which all women's
value is measured and to which all women can be reduced." 64 As
Dorchen Leidholdt puts it: "What other job is so deeply gendered that
one's breasts, vagina and rectum constitute the working equipment? Is
63. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 122 L. Ed. 2d 34, 46, 47 n.2 (1993).
64. Evelina Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies about Prostitution, in THE SEXUAL
LIBERTY AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINIsM 67, 7 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G.
Raymond eds., 1990).
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so deeply gendered that the workers are exclusively women and children
and young men used like women?" 6' In addition, the fact that some
men are also sold for sex helps make prostitution look less than
biological, less like a sex difference. Treatment that is socially and
legally damaging and stereotypical that overwhelmingly burdens one sex,
but is not unique to one sex, is most readily seen as sex discrimination,
A civil action under § 1985(3) would allow prostituted women to
sue pimps for sexual slavery, refuting the lie that prostitution is just a
job. Slavery is a lot of work, but that does not make it just a job,
picking cotton being just picking cotton. The enforced inequality is the
issue.
In addition to these legal tools, the law against pornography that
Andrea Dworkin and I wrote gives civil rights to women in prostitution
in a way that could begin to end that institution. 66 Pornography is an
arm of prostitution. As Annie McCombs once put it to me, when you
make pornography of a woman, you make a prostitute out of her. The
pornography law we wrote is concretely grounded in the experience of
prostituted women; women coerced into pornography are coerced into
prostitution. It is also based on the experience of women in prostitution
who are assaulted because of pornography. Beyond this, under its
trafficking provision, any woman, in or out of prostitution, who can
prove women are harmed through the materials could sue
pornographers for trafficking women. This provision recognizes the
unity of women as a class rather than dividing prostituted women from
all women. The precluded options that get women into prostitution,
hence pornography, affect all women, as does the fact that pornography
harms all women, if not all in the same way.
Subordination on the basis of sex is key to our pornography law.
Pornography is defined as graphic sexually explicit materials that subor-
dinate women (or anyone) on the basis of sex. Women in prostitution
are the first women pornography subordinates. In its prohibition on
coercion into pornography, in making their subordination actionable,
this law sets the first floor beneath the condition of prostituted women,
offers the first civil right that limits how much they can be violated. It
does not do all that they need, but it is a lot more than the nothing
that they have.
65. Leidholdt, sipra note 28, at 138-39.
66. See ANDREA DWORYIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY & CVL
RIGHTS: A NEw DAY FOR WXOMEN'S EQUALITY apps. A, B, & C (1988).
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This law uses the artifact nature of pornography to hold the perpe-
trators accountable for what they do. Before this, the pictures have been
used against women: to blackmail them into prostitution and keep
them there, as a technologically sophisticated way of possessing and
exchanging women as a class. Under this law; the pornography becomes
proof of the woman's injury as well as an instance of it.
Because pornography affects all women and connects all forms of
sexual subordination, so does this law. And this law reaches the pornog-
raphy. The way subordination is done in pornography is the way it is
done in prostitution is the way it is done in the rest of the world: rape,
battering, sexual abuse of children, sexual harassment, and murder are
sold in prostitution and are the acts out of which pornography is made.
Addressing pornography in this way builds a base among women for
going after prostitution as a violation of equality rights.
For years I have been saying that I do not know what to do,
legally, about prostitution. I still do not. State constitutions and human
rights remedies could be adapted to use the argument I offer here. The
Florida statute Meg Baldwin wrote and got passed is brilliant and is
beginning to be used by women. 67 Recent international initiatives build
on superb long-term work and support these efforts.68 I do know that
we need to put the power to act directly in women's hands more than
we have.69
These thoughts are offered to honor Evelina Giobbe's demand for
an institutional policy response to the reality of prostitution, toward the
civil rights all women are entitled to.
67. FLA. STAT. ch. 796.09 (1992) (providing a cause of action for those coerced into
prostitution to sue their pimps for compensatory and punitive damages). See
Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1
Micn. J. GENDER & L. 65, 70 (1993) (reporting that several cases utilizing this
statute are currently underway at the discovery stage prior to filing).
68. See Gayle Kirshenbaum, A Potential Landmark for Female Human Rights, Ms.,
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 13 (report on proposed U.N. Convention Against All Forms of
Sexual Exploitation).
69. The proposed Sexual Exploitation convention would require states' parties to adopt
legislature to "hold liable" traffickers in pornography. International Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Sexual Exploitation, Sept. 1993, Art. 6(d).
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